



ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION ACADEMY

**Focus on the Problem, not the Treaty Using
Principled Negotiation to Establish Common
Ground Between Critics & Proponents of the
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons**

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Note: *The views presented in this memorandum are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the organizations or institutions with which they are affiliated.*

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Policy Memo

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SUBJECT: Focus on the Problem, Not the Treaty Using Principled Negotiation to Establish Common Ground Between Critics & Proponents of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

1. Executive Summary

The 2026 NPT Review Cycle is facing a drastically deteriorated global security environment. Against this background, a dialogue between critics and proponents of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has, at the same time, become more difficult and more relevant. We argue that TPNW-critics and -proponents, despite their differing positions, also share interests. By applying the Harvard Principled Negotiation Method, we focus on these interests to create options for mutual gain and translate them into policy recommendations for the 2026 NPT Review Cycle. In a first step, we identify three groups of state actors that are especially relevant for establishing common ground between TPNW-proponents and -critics: (1) Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), (2) TPNW-states, and (3) Nuclear-Allied states. For the group of NWS, we further distinguish between Western NWS, Russia and China. In a second step, we identify interests, positions, and the Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) for the three actor-groups as well as the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) for the “negotiation” between them. Finally, in a third step, we present four issues that could be promising for reaching common ground: environmental remediation and victim assistance; risk reduction, peaceful use, and nuclear disarmament verification. We elaborate on how these issues could be implemented and derive policy recommendations that are presented at the outset of our policy brief.

2. Policy Recommendations

For the 2026 NPT Review Cycle, we recommend the following major points of action for (1) environmental remediation and victim assistance; (2) risk reduction; (3) peaceful uses; and (4) nuclear disarmament verification:

- **environmental remediation and victim assistance:** convene an expert-level conference on the “Legacy of Nuclear Testing”;
- **risk reduction:** introduce inclusive sessions on risk reduction into the Review Cycle to eventually be complimented by an inclusive consultation mechanism on perceived nuclear threats;
- **peaceful uses:** pursue the inclusion of non-traditional actors;
- **nuclear disarmament verification:** engage TPNW-states, Russia and China in nuclear disarmament verification through a new initiative led by a bridge-building state.

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In Table 1 below, for each of our policy recommendations, we have indicated potential “addressees”.

Table 1 Four issues, specific policy recommendations and addressees for establishing common ground between TPNW-critics and proponents.

Issue	Policy Recommendation	Addressee
Environmental Remediation and Victim Assistance	Hold Conference on “Legacy of Nuclear Testing”	Australia & NPDI & CTBTO
Risk Reduction	Convene inclusive Sessions on Risk Reduction at NPT Cycle	NPT Presidency
Peaceful Use	Include non-traditional actors	IAEA Director General
Nuclear Disarmament Verification	Inclusive Nuclear Disarmament Verification Initiative facilitated by bridge-building state	Kazakhstan

3. The Policy Challenge and a Window of Opportunity – Keeping TPNW-proponents and TPNW-critics engaged with each other and the NPT

NWS and their allies on one hand, and NNWS on the other, have differing interests with respect to the global nuclear order and assign different priority to the NPT pillars. While all NWS, Western and Non-Western, show little interest in disarmament, most of the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) hold a core interest in the latter. Slow progress on disarmament led NNWS to create the TPNW which entered into force in 2021 (Müller & Wunderlich, 2020, p. 174 ff.). Proponents of the TPNW pursue a strategy to delegitimize nuclear weapons to “steadily build a robust global peremptory norm against them” (TPNW, 2022). This strategy has so far been met with heavy public backlash from both Western and Non-Western NWS (UK, 2018) as well as allies of NWS (NATO, 2020).

Despite their differing interests regarding disarmament and their polarized position towards the TPNW, TPNW-proponents and TPNW-critics also share interests. We therefore argue that applying the Harvard Principled Negotiation method that focuses on interests rather than positions may help to identify policy suggestions for reaching common ground. We use the terms “negotiations” and “negotiation table” in a figurative sense, while no formal negotiations are convened between TPNW-critics- and -proponents, informal negotiation processes seem to be constantly at play.

In the light of the deteriorated global security environment, particularly after February 2022, establishing common ground between TPNW-proponents and TPNW-critics has at the same time become more difficult and more relevant. Even though both camps have been reinforced in their preexisting beliefs about nuclear deterrence (PC Williams, 2022; PC Kimball, 2023), they worked together to adopt common language in the 2022 NPT draft final document (PC Baklitsky, 2023). For instance, the parties agreed on language regarding the TPNW’s entry into force (NPT, 2020) and TPNW-states submitted working papers on the complementarity between the NPT and the TPNW

(Austria, 2022; see also PC Jaquez, 2022). Accordingly, we argue that the 2026 NPT Review Cycle provides an opportunity to work towards common ground between TPNW-proponents and -critics. In this policy brief, we provide recommendations regarding promising issues that policy makers and diplomats could focus on during the 2026 NPT Review Cycle. Our insights are not only based on the analysis of primary sources and literature, but also on 12 interviews conducted with researchers and practitioners in the nuclear arms control field from different regions (China, Germany, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, United States).

4. Policy Implications and Options

In the following, we present the actors that we focused on in our analysis, apply the Harvard Method on their positions and interests and present our analysis of four promising issues for reaching common ground.

4.1. Step 1: Identify Groups of State Actors

We identified three different groups of state actors that are especially relevant for the “negotiations” about the future of the global nuclear order: First, the five NWS recognized under the NPT; second, states that are non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and both actively helped to bring into life and are parties and signatories to the TPNW such as Austria, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, and South Africa (TPNW-states); third, states that are allied with nuclear weapon states (Nuclear-Allied-States) such as NATO members and especially states that are involved in nuclear sharing. We have chosen these specific groups of states, on the one hand, to include representatives from all the spectrum of opinions on the TPNW, i.e. the NWS and the TPNW-states; and, on the other hand, to include representatives of less contested views on the TPNW who could be bridge-builders, i.e. the Nuclear-Allied-states. Despite NWS’ shared position of rejecting the TPNW, their interests and positions on many nuclear weapons questions differ so significantly that we decided to provide a separate analysis for NWS whenever necessary.

4.2. Step 2: Identify Positions versus Interests, the BATNA and the ZOPA

In line with the Harvard Principled Negotiation Method, we identified positions and interests of our actor-groups. Based on the identified interests, we then defined actor-groups’ Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) and the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) for the “negotiation” between the actor-groups. Table 2 in the appendix provides an overview.

Positions at the “Table”

Positions at the “table” are strongly diverging when it comes to nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence: While NWS and Nuclear-Allied States regard nuclear weapons and deterrence - despite being a risky business - as guaranteeing their security (The White House, 2022; PC Zhao, 2023), TPNW-states consider them as a source of intolerable risk and threat and thus of insecurity (Kmentt, 2020). While Nuclear-Allied States and even NWS rhetorically share the goal of a world without nuclear weapons (UK, 2018), they prefer a conditional step-by-step approach that maintains deterrence (UK, 2018). Accordingly, they firmly reject the TPNW and argue that they are not and will never be legally bound by it (UK, 2018).

Interests at Stake

Looking at interests at stake provides a more nuanced picture with more potential for overlap: All groups associate security interests with nuclear weapons. Some of these security interests are opposed: While nuclear weapons and deterrence enhances the security of NWS and their allies (as

well as their power status), it diminishes the security of TPNW-states since they may become victims of nuclear blackmail, nuclear targeting or simply be harmed as innocent bystanders of a nuclear exchange. Other security interests, on the other hand, are shared interests: All groups have a security interest to avoid the explosion of a nuclear weapon. Throughout 2022, this was witnessed by a whole sequence of statements condemning the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in response to Russia's nuclear signaling (see e.g., Bugos, 2022; PC Podvig, 2023). Bracketing diverging security interests and focusing on shared security interests may thus provide a good basis for establishing common ground.

Our analysis also showed that all the groups have legitimacy-interests that could be a promising lever for promoting agreement across divides. The NWS have the interest to maintain the legitimacy of the nuclear normative order revolving around the NPT because it, inter alia, guarantees their privileges. They also have the legitimacy-interest to be perceived as responsible nuclear weapons states internationally (P3, 2022). NWS may even be competing with each other for NNWS' sympathies (PC Zhao, 2023). Nuclear-Allied States share this legitimacy interest and even attribute it higher importance: since Nuclear-Allied States oftentimes are democratic middle-powers, they especially thrive on being perceived as "good international citizens" (Becker-Jakob et al., 2013), "good allies" and "good governments".

Meanwhile, TPNW-states as well have a core interest in being perceived as legitimate. They want to leverage the recognition stemming from norm-entrepreneurial activities to promote their core interests (Maître, 2019). These interests consist of the right to peaceful use for promoting economic development and the equal implementation of all the NPT-pillars, including disarmament. In other words, their legitimacy interest aligns with a claim to recognitional (voice to be heard), distributive (equal distribution of wealth via effective access to technologies) and institutional justice (equal say in international institutions (Reus-Smit & Zarakol, 2023). In order to actualize these interests, TPNW-states created their own institution - the TPNW - as an act of "self-empowerment" that transforms their status from "bystanders" to active decision-makers (Müller & Wunderlich, 2020; PC Kassenova, 2023). An alternative pathway to satisfy their justice interests could be to provide TPNW-states with more opportunities for recognition and participation in established international institutions such as NPT Review Cycles and to offer economic opportunities.

BATNAs to Resort to

The BATNA that is available to the different actor groups varies in width: While NWS have a rather broad BATNA, Nuclear-Allied States and TPNW-states have a more limited BATNA. If NWS were faced with demands that threaten core security- or status interests (e.g., deterrence), NWS could minimize their negotiation efforts or even withdraw from the multilateral "negotiation table" Their status as superpowers makes it unlikely that they would be confronted with major economic, or security repercussions and they may be willing to pay the cost of legitimacy losses (PC Zhao, 2023). Yet, it would be in NWS' interest to incentivize TPNW-states to remain engaged with the NPT.

For Nuclear-Allied States, the BATNA equally consists of sticking with nuclear sharing and deterrence instead of engaging with TPNW-states when pressured to give up these components of their security strategy. However, it appears that not engaging with TPNW-states would be more disadvantageous to Nuclear-Allied States since they more heavily rely on normative power resources of being perceived as legitimate. This is what makes them typical "common-good-driven

bridge-builders” (Müller & Wunderlich, 2018, p. 352) who are more likely to stay at the negotiation table.

For TPNW-states the BATNA is even more limited. At the end of the day, they need the NWS to achieve their economic and development interests based on nuclear technologies and their security goals of nuclear disarmament. They thus have a considerable incentive to remain at the “table”. Yet, if NWS did not make any concessions whatsoever, TPNW-states would have the BATNA to further shift their energy and attention away from the NPT and towards the TPNW. If the NPT is divested of much of NNWS’ support, it would lose in status and importance. This would also challenge the NWS’ authority in the nuclear field. NWS therefore are incentivized to engage with TPNW-leaders to a degree that prevents them from resorting to their BATNA.

ZOPA to Work on

Based on the analysis of interests and BATNAs, we have derived a few “demarcation lines” for a ZOPA among NWS, Nuclear-Allied States and TPNW-states. Within this ZOPA, we have identified four issues that seem especially suitable for establishing common ground. These issues *focus on a shared problem, rather than on the position that states take towards the TPNW*.

First, as preventing the use of a nuclear weapon is a shared security interest, **(1) risk reduction** represents an issue to engage on provided that it is not directly related to demands for an end to nuclear deterrence or nuclear abolition (PC Williams, 2022) and not perceived as a replacement for nuclear disarmament. Second, the fact-based humanitarian agenda of **(2) victim assistance and environmental remediation** lies within the ZOPA as far as it does not entail naming-and-shaming of NWS. Yet, the above issues are conditional upon NWS showing some credible commitment to nuclear disarmament. One option for NWS to do so without diminishing their deterrence would be to become more active in **(3) multilateral disarmament verification**. Finally, to keep TPNW-engaged with the NPT in the long run, NWS and Nuclear-Allied States could engage more on the issue of **(4) peaceful use**. In contrast, issues that clearly lie outside the ZOPA are nuclear deterrence (PC Perkovich, 2022) and abolition. Thus, these issues should be bracketed in the ongoing discussions.

4.3. Step 3: Analyze Issues for Promising “Negotiations” and Elaborate on How They Could be Implemented.

In the following, we elaborate on implementation ideas for the four issues that lie within the ZOPA.

4.3.1. Environmental remediation and victim assistance

The fact that states could agree on recognizing the humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear weapons explosions in the Tenth NPT RevCon draft final document (NPT, 2020) illustrates that the topic could provide fertile ground for rebuilding habits of cooperation (PC Kassenova, 2023). Engagement with the issue may allow NWS to satisfy their legitimacy interests at relatively little expense for their security and status interests. It may allow TPNW-states to have, inter alia, recognitional and epistemic justice (Reus-Smit & Zarakol, 2023) and cater to their security concerns in turn. Nuclear-Allied States may function as bridge builders here, thereby gaining legitimacy while not having to compromise on nuclear deterrence.

Discussions about mitigating potential future nuclear weapons use might be rejected by NWS since they might perceive it to question both the legitimacy and effectiveness of nuclear deterrence. Convening a conference on the “Legacy of Nuclear Testing” to focus on the consequences of past nuclear testing might thus be the more viable alternative (idea developed with PC Williams, 2022). A potential initiator of such a conference might be Australia, a Nuclear-Allied State that is not only facing growing domestic debates about arms control and disarmament (PC Williams, 2022; Warren A., 2022), and was itself affected by nuclear testing. As an ideal bridge-builder, Australia could leverage its membership in the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) to secure broader diplomatic and financial support for the conference.

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) might also be interested in posing as co-sponsor since the conference might help to reinforce the global testing moratorium, promote CTBT’s entry into force and generate support for CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (PC Williams, 2022). To gain support among NWS, the conference should have a data-based technical outlook and refrain from naming-and-shaming strategies. (PC Williams, 2022; PC Kennedy, 2022; PC Baklitsky, 2023; PC Podvig, 2023; PC van Dassen, 2023).

4.3.2. Risk Reduction

The issue of nuclear risk reduction has gained in relevance precisely due to the deteriorated international security environment. That being the case, it featured prominently at the Tenth NPT RevCon with three rather diverse actor groups submitting working papers on risk reduction: the Stockholm initiative, which includes a number of Nuclear-Allied States, Austria, one of the leaders of the TPNW, and P5 (Austria, 2022; Stockholm initiative, 2021).

TPNW-states hold that risk reduction must not be a substitute for disarmament and it was not until P5 agreed with that statement that discussions at the 2022 RevCon became less contentious (PC Baklitsky, 2023). Thus, TPNW-states promote their interests in disarmament and recognition by taking this position, but they nevertheless do share a security interest in reducing the risk of nuclear use. As pointed out in some of the NPT working papers, reducing risks associated with nuclear weapons is in the security interest of all states and humanity itself (Austria, 2022; Stockholm initiative, 2021).

That said, states see sources of risks differently. While NWS have the interest to prevent an actual nuclear explosion, they at the same time have the interest for the other side to perceive a certain risk of nuclear escalation (PC Zhao, 2023; PC Podvig, 2023). In other words, a certain degree of strategic ambiguity is risky but nuclear deterrence relies on this uncertainty (Lewis, 2022). Since these policies of nuclear deterrence pose risks of catastrophic global consequences it is important that NNWS are meaningfully involved in discussions about risk reduction (FRS, 2019; PC Kimball, 2022).

At the 2022 NPT RevCon, states parties proposed to dedicate a period of time at each of the next PrepComs to discuss risk reduction. This idea could be picked-up by the Conference Presidency. The sessions may serve as a structured dialogue between NWS with TPNW-states and may focus on P5 reporting on actions they take to reduce risks. They could be a useful starting point for strengthening inclusive risk reduction (PC Kimball, 2022) and for enhancing accountability.

Those sessions for regular exchange could eventually be complemented by a consultation mechanism on perceived nuclear threats. This mechanism would allow any state - including NNWS - that perceives a nuclear threat to ask for an explanation from the state that engages in risky nuclear signaling. Such a mechanism, similar to the Vienna Document Art. III-mechanism, could reduce risks of misunderstanding and thus escalation if no nuclear use was intended. On the other hand, if a state refrained from providing an explanation for its behavior of concern, this may serve as an early warning sign.

4.3.3 Peaceful Use

Peaceful use is an issue that allows for “dovetailing”: Access to and non-discriminatory use of nuclear technology to advance national developmental and economic objectives represents a core interest to many NNWS-states, some of which are also TPNW-members, while it is an issue with relatively little salience for many NWS and their allies. Yet, since the NPT is the institution that guarantees the right to peaceful use, focusing on the issue may incentivize TPNW-states to remain engaged with the NPT. Overall, the renewed focus on the third pillar - seen as less contentious and more convergent than the other two (PC Baklitsky, 2023; PC Kirsten, 2023) - could reiterate the overall value of the regime and would therefore be a viable path to focus on during the 2026 Review Cycle. In order to strengthen the institutional guarantee of peaceful use and thereby the NPT, NWS and their allies should focus on technical solutions for enabling peaceful use rather than on political considerations (Carnegie, 2019). In that regard, discussions at the final RevCon yielded valuable language that links peaceful use to sustainable development as a global concern and that may be built-upon despite the failure to adopt the final document (PC Kirsten, 2023). One idea is to strengthen the engagement of and cooperation among non-traditional actors such as development aid agencies, medical and research communities, or industries (NPT, 2020; VCDNP, 2021) so that they can become effective facilitators of peaceful use. For instance, the IAEA could conduct an outreach side-event at the first NPT PrepCom in August 2023 and encourage development aid agencies - who have so far been little aware of the potential of nuclear science and technology (NPT, 2020) - to participate in the remaining PrepComs and RevCon.

4.3.4. Multilateral Disarmament Verification

Throughout recent years, several initiatives on nuclear disarmament verification such as the UK-Norway Initiative (UKNI), the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership (the Quad) and the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV, under auspices of US) emerged. NWS’ interests align with these initiatives, not least because of their technical, less politically sensitive nature. By engaging in one of the initiatives, NWS can, inter alia, prove themselves responsive to demands for pursuing disarmament.

These initiatives are alike in that they are led by Western NWS and mostly composed of Nuclear-allied states that serve their legitimacy interests through participating in nuclear disarmament verification.

Neither China and Russia nor many TPNW-states play a big role in multilateral nuclear disarmament verification endeavors. Both have ceased their participation as observers in the IPNDV (Sanders-Zakre, 2018) since they seem less interested in being a part of an initiative led by Western states, in particular the USA (PC Zhao, 2023; PC Baklitsky, 2022).

A disarmament initiative that is truly multilateral in the sense that it includes a more diverse set of states might be useful (Elbahtimy, 2019, p. 50). TPNW-states should be interested in disarmament verification since it serves as positive enabler for progress on disarmament (TPNW, 2022) and TPNW-states will eventually need to develop verification procedures to reach full disarmament (PC Podvig, 2023). Furthermore, participating in disarmament verification frameworks would satisfy their justice-interest of being included on nuclear disarmament matters. To incentivize a broader set of states to engage in multilateral nuclear disarmament verification, any new initiative would have to be facilitated by a non-Western state (PC Zhao, 2023). Kazakhstan may be a promising candidate for this task. It has experience in cooperating with Russia and the United States to remove nuclear weapons from its territory (PC Kassenova, 2023) and it recently co-hosted events on the topic of capacity building in nuclear disarmament verification (Vertic & UNODA, 2022). That said, nuclear disarmament verification efforts would be more difficult without NWS' involvement, since they are the primary knowledge holders in the field. Thus, the new multilateral initiative has to include NWS (PC van Dassen, 2023).

5. Conclusion and Outlook

This policy brief suggested pathways to finding common ground between critics and proponents of the TPNW by placing states' interests - rather than positions - at the center of the analysis. The core argument based on the Harvard Principled Negotiation Method is that, having bracketed issues of fundamental disagreement, it is possible to find areas of possible agreement between states holding different views about the TPNW. While states fundamentally disagree about desirability, feasibility and need for either nuclear deterrence or nuclear ban, they share common interest in the sustainability of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime that guarantee - though asymmetrically - certain security, legitimacy, and status interests of both NWS and NNWS. We identified four areas in which all states might create options to satisfy their interests – (1) victim assistance and environmental remediation, (2) risk reduction, (3) peaceful use, and (4) nuclear disarmament verification. In our NPT-centered analysis we focused on nuclear possessor states recognized by the treaty. Further research on how to engage nuclear possessor states outside the NPT in these discussions is required.

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Personal communications

1. Heather Williams, personal communication, December 5, 2022.
2. George Perkovich, personal communication, November 8, 2022.
3. Tonie Jaquez, personal communication, December 7, 2022.
4. Daryl Kimball, personal communication, January 7, 2023.
5. Andrey Baklitsky, personal communication, January 13, 2022.
6. Tong Zhao, personal communication, January 18, 2023.
7. Pavel Podvig, personal communication, January 21, 2023.
8. Togzhan Kassenova, personal communication, January 23, 2023.
9. Ingrid Kirsten, personal communication, February 9, 2023.
10. Lars van Dassen, personal communication, February 9, 2023.
11. Laura Kennedy, personal communication, December 6, 2022.

Appendix

Table 2 Analysis of positions, interests, BATNA and ZOPA of the three groups of states actors

	NWS	TPNW-states	Nuclear-Allied states
Positions	<p>Nuclear weapons might pose a risk but provide security through deterrence.</p> <p>Disarmament is not an end in itself.</p> <p>Step-by-step-approach to nuclear disarmament that upholds deterrence.</p> <p>Rejection of TPNW</p>	<p>Nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are a source of intolerable risk and threat and thus a source of insecurity.</p> <p>Disarmament is a priority as it is a way to security.</p> <p>Disarmament through, inter alia, stigmatization</p> <p>Step-by-step approach is not rejected but viewed as paralyzed</p>	<p>Nuclear weapons might pose a risk but provide security through deterrence.</p> <p>Step-by-step-approach to nuclear disarmament that upholds deterrence.</p> <p>Some hold more progressive views on disarmament</p> <p>Rejection or great skepticism of TPNW</p>

<p>Interests</p>	<p>Security interest: Secured by nuclear weapons' deterrence but at same time avoid the use of nuclear weapons (=humanitarian interest)</p> <p>Status interest: uphold nuclear order that recognizes special status of NWS and thus enables them to secure their interests (uphold NPT)</p> <p>Legitimacy interest: be regarded as responsible nuclear weapons states. For Western NWS also to be regarded as those responsive to their allies' concerns.</p>	<p>Security interest: not become victims of nuclear attack or negatively affected by other states' nuclear exchange; i.e. avoid the use of nuclear weapons or detonation by accident, miscalculation or design (= humanitarian interest).</p> <p>Status interest: be recognized as states that shape, inter alia, the nuclear normative order and contribute to discussions just as NWS and nuclear allied states do.</p> <p>Legitimacy interest: be regarded as equal members of the community</p>	<p>Security interests: secured by nuclear weapons' deterrence but at the same time avoid the use of nuclear weapons (= humanitarian interest)</p> <p>Status interest: keep nuclear sharing and be part of the Club but at the same time perceived as NNWS complying with (NPT) rules.</p> <p>Legitimacy-interest: responsiveness to domestic civil and global concerns/pressure</p>
<p>BATNA</p>	<p>Quite broad: if the other side makes demands that threaten core interests such as deterrence, they will withdraw from the multilateral negotiation table</p>	<p>Quite limited: need NWS to achieve their goals of disarmament and non-use; But for interest of reaching status, they have the BATNA to invest more into building own normative framework of investing into NPT instead of framework; BATNA to place a lower priority on the NPT and with this to reshape the nuclear order</p>	<p>Quite limited: need to engage with NNWS and domestic concerns to gain legitimacy but would be better off to give up legitimacy than to give up deterrence</p>
<p>ZOPA</p>	<p>Risk reduction that is not related to disarmament or abolition; humanitarian agenda as far as it is not mutually exclusive with logic of deterrence; victim assistance and environmental remediation that is approached without stigmatization; all of these issues are somewhat conditioned on NWS showing some credible commitment to reach disarmament, e.g., through disarmament verification. Further condition is that All of these issues, as long as nuclear deterrence remains very much intact, peaceful</p>		

	use as an issue that keeps TPNW-states engaged with NPT but does not question deterrence.
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